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1 Introduction 
The theory of the firm is a central element in modern economics and the firm is one of the 
central economic institutions of capitalism. An economic explanation of why firms exist - first 
suggested by Coase (1937) - is because they are efficient. The costs of organizing a 
transaction within the firm must be less than the costs of using the market for firms to exist. 
The modern theory of the firm explains the boundaries of the firm based on three major costs 
of organizing firms: communication and coordination costs (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975, 
Radner 1992) agency costs (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) and the hold up problem (Klein et al. 
1978, Williamson 1985). These costs can be lumped together and viewed as different kinds of 
transaction costs. Common to this literature is the view that the size of the firm is largely 
independent of technological considerations which dominate the literature on plant size. The 
neglect of technology in this literature was noted by a number of commentators (e.g. 
Antonelli 1999, Lindbeck and Snower 2003). However, most modern developments in the 
falling in the rubric economic theory of the firm have looked at the firm as bundle of bilateral 
contracts. This implies a major neglect of the technological and organizational aspects of 
production. This view is epitomized by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), who do not see any 
relevant difference between the relation which occurs between employer and employee and 
the one between a grocer and his customers. 
 
The evolutionary theory of the firm provides an alternative explanation of the firm based on 
routines. In a world where agents differ in their perceptions of the environment, and where 
communication, acquisition of information and computation are limited and costly, 
coordination can only be achieved by means of the definition of a common set of rules and 
codes which are understood and shared by the members of the organization involved in 
economic interaction. While it is true that the evolutionary theory focuses especially on the 
technological aspects of production, it also stresses the cognitive nature of the organizational 
structure of the firm. 
 
The evolutionary theory of the firm in its original form as proposed by Nelson and Winter 
(1982) is similar to the 'black-box' view of neoclassical economics a device to study 
evolutionary dynamics. This view of the firm does not consider the organization of the firm in 
an explicit way. However, the firm is described as entity processing, storing and producing 
knowledge. The evolutionary theory of the firm can be more than a device to study industrial 
dynamics. Notions like 'corporate coherence' (Teece et al. 1994) or 'routines as truce' (Nelson 
and Winter 1982) point in this direction. 
 
2 Evolutionary economics 
Evolutionary economics sees the economy as a scientific domain characterized by 
disequilibrium processes in which economic agents create and adapt to novelty through 
learning rather than a system in equilibrium or resting in a steady state (Witt 1991, Nelson 
1995, Saviotti 1997, Foster and Metcalfe 2001, Fagerberg 2003, Cantner and Hanusch 2002). 
The influence of Schumpeter on evolutionary economics can not be overstated. The reasons 
for Schumpeter's appeal to many economists stems from the fact that he stressed the 
qualitative nature of economic change which revolves around the introduction of new goods 
with different characteristics, new methods of production, and new methods of organization. 
Schumpeter was a major influence on the work of Nelson and Winter, whose seminal 
contribution An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change provided the point of origin for the 
modern study of the evolutionary behavior in economic systems. The starting point of Nelson 
and Winter's contribution is a critique of the standard theory of production. Their emphasis is 
on learning (mainly technological) and selection among heterogeneous firms. The basic tenets 
are outlined Nelson and Winter as follows,  
 
[t]he firms in our evolutionary theory will be treated as motivated by profit and engaged in 
search for ways to improve their profits, but their actions will not be assumed to be profit 
maximizing over well-defined and exogenously given choice sets [...] Our theory emphasizes 
the tendency for the most profitable firms out of business; however, we do not focus our 
analysis on hypothetical states of 'industry equilibrium' in which all the unprofitable firms no 
longer are in the industry and the profitable ones are at their desired size.  
(Nelson and Winter 1992, p. 4) 
 
Since Nelson and Winter's contribution it became more and more customary to equate 
changes in economic structure, the changing relative frequencies of different actions, 
behaviors and institutions with evolutionary change and to attribute the ultimate source of 
change to the co-existence of rival and different forms of behavior. Evolution in the context of 
evolutionary economics means that economic development over time is an open ended 
dynamic process over an open state space. This shows that evolutionary economics is not a 
one to one transfer of evolutionary theory or metaphors from biology into economics. Far 
from that, evolutionary economics takes into account the specificity of the economic sphere. 
The framework outlined in Nelson and Winter's contribution has work has proved to be 
fruitful, especially in the area of economics of technology and growth theory. Three 
distinguishing and interrelated traits of evolutionary economics can be identified:  
1. While there is disagreement on the specific definitions, there is agreement on the fact 
that knowledge and information are central ingredients of the approach of evolutionary 
economics. Economic systems are knowledge-based. Economic knowledge is 
conceived as set of routines that are reproduced through practice. The processes of 
knowledge creation and destruction underpin and drive economic growth and 
qualitative change. The growth of knowledge cannot be meaningfully captured as a 
constellation of equilibrating forces (Nelson and Winter 1982, Metcalfe 1998, Witt 
1997, Foster and Metcalfe 2001). 
2. Evolutionary economics takes a population approach instead of a typological 
approach based on representative agents. The heterogeneity of economic behavior is 
based on the distribution of knowledge and information within the economy (Hayek 
1945). Heterogeneity drives economic change, which can cast in terms of observable 
changes in the compositions of population of firms, technologies, and industries. The 
decentralized nature of the economic system implies that there is massive parallelism 
of computation and behavior within the economic systems. Together with spillovers 
the decentralized organization creates not only the problem solving capability of the 
economic system but also the capability to formulate new problems and new behavior 
(Dosi 1997, Metcalfe 1998). 
3. The interdependence between selection and development is a first characteristic of 
evolutionary economics. Competition as selection process provides a process 
structuring economic activity (Metcalfe 1998) and imposing a requirement of 
procedural rationality on participants. Selection changes the frequencies of entities 
(measures as numbers or market shares) in the population according to rewards. From 
a perspective of variety generation, markets are institutions which not only coordinate 
economic behavior but facilitate change, entrepreneurship and challenges to 
established behaviors. Selection processes operate on variety, they destroy variety. 
The generation of variety and the selection of variety interact in the process of 
development. In order to have economic development, variety needs to be re-created.  
The outcome of the operation of an evolutionary process is adaptation, the fit of entities in 
consideration with the properties of the selection environment. In this respect, it has to be 
noted that evolutionary processes are not compatible with completely random behavior. Every 
notion of evolution which postulates that behavior is random ignores the requirement of 
inertia of any evolutionary argument. In other words, there must be some degree of heredity 
of behavioral routines, technologies, and attributes in the economic system. The inertia 
argument implies that the behavioral characteristics of the agents and units of selection must 
be correlated over time. This suggests that constructed 'random' worlds may change over time 
but not evolve in an evolutionary sense. This means, in order to construct an evolutionary 
argument for the economic sphere, it must be assured that the behavior of agents and 
organizations changes more slowly than the rate at which the selection process takes place. 
  
3 The evolutionary theory of the firm 
Nelson and Winter begin with a critique of the standard production theory. Standard 
production theory starts from the set of all technologically feasible technologies and assumes 
that each firm can operate these technologies if it wishes. Each of the different production 
techniques available is parameterized by a vector of inputs and outputs corresponding to the 
productive transformation a firm can accomplish. The set of all optimal techniques which 
provide the maximum output with given inputs define the production function. Nelson and 
Winter criticize this conception of production as not depicting the reality of the economic 
problem of production, where the idea that all technological knowledge is available in an 
articulate way in a book of blueprints is not met. Especially the implicit assumption that 
technological knowledge can be written down at a negligible cost is target of their critique. 
The existence of universally available technological knowledge implies that technological 
change is exogenous and the activities of research and development are separated from actual 
production. They contrast this theory with their own theory of production based on 
differential capabilities, embedded in the personal and organizational structure of firms. Skills 
on the personal level, and routines at the organizational level form the repository of 
knowledge with in turn defines the production possibilities of firms. The important aspect for 
Nelson and Winter was that the theory emphasized 'firm differences'. Thereby Nelson and 
Winter (1982) proposed an interpretation of the production technology as 'production 
knowledge' including beside embodied knowledge in equipment and machinery also tacit 
knowledge, capabilities, skills and even heuristics for problem-solving. Even if this 
knowledge is non-excludable in nature, it is not easily transferable between firms. It is stored 
as routines in the firms. Routines define the technological knowledge of a firm. Following 
Nelson and Winter, evolutionary theorists based their theories of the firm on bounded 
rationality (rule-based behavior) and routines. 
 
The behavior of firms is characterized in terms of technological capabilities, workers skills 
and decision rules. The connecting elements are called routines. Routines are the result of past 
learning efforts and constitute the organizational memory of a firm. As such they are 
embodied in and link activities with the aim of producing goods or processing information. 
Routines can be considered to be repositories of knowledge because they connect in an quasi-
formal way individual skills. A routine is a sequence of condition-action rules for different 
tasks which are executed in sequentially or in parallel. The evolutionary paradigm of the firm 
is deeply rooted in the idea of the firm as an information processor that facilitates the firm's 
capacity to adapt and process new information. Organizational routines are all organizational 
regularities and standardized processes of production and information processing which 
describe the behavioral patterns and production techniques of firms. Nelson (1994) stresses 
that 'a firm can be understood in terms of a hierarchy of practiced organizational routines, 
which define lower order bureaucratization skills and higher order decision procedures for 
choosing what is to be done at the lover level'. Nelson and Winter describe with the term 
routine two different aspects, the cognitive aspects of learning and knowledge on the one hand 
and the organizational aspects of incentives, monitoring and control on the other hand. From 
this stems the conceptual difficulty or confusion on the exact definition what routines are in 
the literature (Cohen et al. 1996). Routines have the double character as problem-solving 
skills and as mechanisms of governance. 
 
Organizational traits are closely related to the function of a 'truce' of routines. March and 
Simon (1993, p.2) state "organization is the transformation of conflict into cooperation". In 
the terminology of game theory this may be expressed as how a prisoner dilemma can be 
transformed into a coordination game. Basically, three different mechanisms can be used to 
achieve this goal: reciprocal altruism, the exclusion of free riding behavior and most 
importantly the repeated nature of the game within an organization. The folk theorem states 
that trigger strategies can support any set of payoffs feasible in the underlying game. The 
selection of equilibria is essentially a coordination problem. No longer are preferences central, 
the beliefs about how will the other players play the game become central. Put in this context 
a routine is a specific way to play the organizational coordination game. Routines provide 
organization-specific conventions. There will be routines within groups, but in organizational 
context of firms highly important are the rules of the game and the way how this game is 
played between different subgroups (different divisions or departments) of a firm. 
Inconsistent conventions lead to frictions in coordination and to losses in performance. 
 
The specific feature of the evolutionary approach is that it explains the adaptive behaviors of 
firms through the tension between innovation and various selection mechanisms. Coriat and 
Weinstein (1995) argue that an evolutionary theory of the firm has the advantage, compared 
to other theories of the firm, to provide an explanation for three issues of importance to 
understand the nature of firms:  
 
1. It explains how a firm can be defined: through the set of routines and competencies 
that the firm encompasses. 
2. It explains why firms differ: because they rely on a different set of routines which are 
firm-specific and cannot be transferred at low cost. 
3. It explains the dynamics of firms: through the combined mechanisms of searching and 
selection and the possibility of transforming a set of secondary routines into the core 
activity.  
The evolutionary theory thus provides a theory of firm differences and dynamic change based 
on learning and adaptation. Thereby it is a device to study industrial dynamics. However, 
even if the evolutionary theory is not primarily focused on the boundaries of the firm, it 
suggests an alternative approach to this issue - namely that the boundaries of the firm lie 
where information is most easily codified and a shared context is created which allows to 
minimize transaction costs associated with problems of limited (or missing) competence. In 
this respect it is true that routines may help saving transaction costs associated with 
information processing. But there are distinctive differences between transaction cost theory 
and the evolutionary approach. The transaction costs approach views the firm as an efficient 
outcome of market selection processes, which are usually treated as black box. The 
evolutionary paradigm, in contrast, is based on cumulative processes which do not necessarily 
ensure the 'survival of the fittest' but advocates a 'weak selection process' that is based on 
existing structures. 
 
However, there are still a number of open questions which needs to be answered for the 
evolutionary theory to provide a true theory of the firm:  
1. The theory how routines change is not well developed. The internal selection process 
within the firm needs more empirical and theoretical content.  
2. Routines as a truce: The evolutionary firm has little to say regarding the conflicts 
within firms, e.g. capital - labor conflict or corporate governance. The role of routines 
as truce is largely unexplored.  
3. The evolutionary theory of the firm is largely silent on the issue of entrepreneurship 
(Witt 1998).  
Among these unsettled questions the issue of how routines change is a very important one. 
Therefore let us concentrate on this issue, in order to do this we need first to look in more 
detail at the foundations of the basic concept of the evolutionary theory of the firm: routines 
and rule-based behavior. 
 
 
4  Routines and rule-based behavior 
Routines are specific instances of rule-based behavior on the level of an organization. They 
are decision processes that require low levels of creative information processing (rules of 
thumb), but can be complex automatic behaviors which involve high levels of repetitive 
information processing. Cohen et al. (1996) define a routine as "an executable capability for 
repeated performance in some context that has been learned by an organization in response to 
selection pressures" (p. 683). 
 
However, as a general theory of decision making the concept of routine is not precise enough. 
A consensus has emerged that routines relate to organizations whereas rule-based behavior 
relate to individuals. Rule-based individual behavior has been argued, may provide the core 
for an alternative behavioral theory of decision making (Cohen et al. 1996, Heiner 1988). As 
modern rational choice theory modern theorizing on rule-based behavior is based on firm 
individualistic foundations. Thereby the concept of rule-based behavior may form a 
theoretical basis to explain organizational routines. 
 
Most economic models which involve learning argue that only some well specified dynamics 
on the learning on the content of the rules are needed, as it is assumed that,  
1. That the representations of the agent are strict partitions of the states of the world.  
2. That the set of possible actions is known and relatively trivial, that implies that the 
known actions do not differ from the possible actions.  
3. That the interpretations are always true, there is no need for an interpretation. The 
representation is redundant as there is transparency of the form the agent knows what 
really happened.  
However, as Dosi et al. (2004) argue, it might well be that another model might well be useful 
as a first descriptive approximation, where it is assumed that:  
1. The action repertoire is fixed.  
2. Learning is basically about the development of representations and models which map 
the invariant action repertoire on the payoff.  
Behavioral adaptation is learning about the representations of the environment, the 
appropriateness of rules and the pay-off function attached to these rule given the environment. 
This shows that rule-based behavior is essentially dynamic, based on behavioral adaptation. 
The prime difference to rational choice theory is that theories of rule-based behavior see the 
adaptiveness at the level of the rules of actions. The individuals are not presumed to be case 
by case maximizers, capable to understand all contingencies of the choice situation. What is 
ascribed to them is the capability to change their rules by learning from past experience. Rule-
based theorizing leads attention toward the process of adaptive learning (Vanberg 1994, p. 
29). 
 
A rule is essentially a condition - action rule applied to choice situations, which allows 
individuals to trigger an action when a condition is realized. There is no finite set of 
alternative rules at the disposition among which is chosen. And it makes not much sense to 
speak of a 'given best' rule, as the very nature of rules implies that their appropriateness can 
only be judged by their performance on a longer sequence of applications.1 This shows that in 
the context of rule-based behavior there is more to bounded rationality that costly decision 
making (Radner 1996). Costly decision making refers to to costly activities related to (i) 
observation, (ii) information processing that is computing, (iii) memory, and (iv) 
communication. The last category is especially important in the context of an organization 
                                                 
1 A question which is debated in the literature is whether rule-following behavior is a subset of rational choice 
theory. That is, can it be rationally chosen to follow a rule. This question seems to be innocent, however, it boils 
down to the question: Can it be assumed that economic actors can chose to switch on and off their rational 
calculation? This would require some kind of 'meta-rationality', and a two step procedure of rational choice. In a 
first stage the decision maker decides rationally if he decides a rule or if he makes a choice. In the second stage 
he follows the rule or makes a rational choice. However, such a theory would be not much different from an 
adaptive learning process about rules, that is about evaluating rules ex-post and adjusting the rule.  
 
when the decision making process is assigned to a team of individuals. If these costly 
processes refer to binding constraints they need to be taken in account in the decision makers 
optimization problem. If they relate to resource use in time, then extensive decision making 
causes delay, which may result in lower effectiveness of the decision. 
 
The same is true for truly bounded rationality in the sense of Radner (1996), who does 
identify (i) inconsistency, (ii) ambiguity and vagueness, (iii) unawareness and (iv) the failure 
of logical omniscience as leading to true bounded rationality. Inconsistency may derive that 
the decision maker has inconsistent preferences, as he is forced to articulate preferences about 
which he is not sure. Ambiguity and vagueness relate to the interpretation of the world, the 
learning process about revisions of the model the agent holds. The problem is that the agent 
knows that he will revise the model in future, he has no ability whatsoever to predict what the 
revisions will be. Vagueness and ambiguity can refer to the uncertainty of consequences, that 
is, uncertainty about the payoff function or vagueness about the states of the world. While it 
may well be that a rational choice theory about learning of the model is feasible, the problem 
of 'failure of logical omniscience' is fundamental, as it refers to the fact that the agent "does 
not know all of the relevant logical implication of what he knows" (Radner 2000, p. 653). 
Radner (2000) gives examples which illustrate the problem, one of these is: "Given all that is 
known, theoretically and empirically, about business organizations in general, and about 
telecommunications and AT&T in particular, should At&T reorganize itself internally, and if 
so, how?" (Radner 2000, p. 654). 
 
As Radner remarks, the problem with the 'failure of logical omniscience' for any theory of 
rational choice including theories of bounded rationality is the meaning of 'rationality' in this 
specific case. Rule-based behavior in contrast replaces 'rationality' with adaptability. There 
are still problems with the formulation of a 'general' theory of behavioral adaptation. In this 
context the distinction between information and knowledge is extremely useful. Information 
can be defined as data relating to states of the world and the state-contingent consequences 
that follow from events. Knowledge in contrast is an information-produced belief (Fransman 
1994), the cognitive frame to interpret information and to transform information into to new 
knowledge. And rules are essentially a specific form of (tacit or formal) knowledge. 
 
Whenever one abandons the most restrictive assumption on information perfectness and 
symmetry among agents, organizational forms do matter because incentives, information 
flows, and behavior differ according to the particular architecture of rules (corporate culture) 
of each firm. Routines are not behavior. They are stored behavioral capabilities. These 
capabilities involve knowledge and memory, and the firm by being the storage of routines is a 
coordination device for economic, especially productive, action. 
 
 
5  The firm as a collection of organizational routines 
Routines are not isolated. They are interdependent within firms. Business firms and other 
economic organizations are more or less complex networks of routines, where products (also 
information) of one activity are inputs of another. Some of the ties in this network can be very 
strong, while others may be weaker. The strength of the connection can result from strict 
technical complementarities, but also from dynamic complementarities, which capture 
learning spillovers, synergy effects and other mechanisms generating dynamic 
complementarities. 
 
The same production activities e.g. manufacture of cars can be routinized in different ways, as 
emphasized by Dosi and Coriat (1998), who compare the different management styles, 
routines, incentives and control mechanisms in American and Japanese manufacturing. The 
differences show how knowledge and competence can be allocated in quite different ways. 
Aoki (1990) has emphasized this implies different internal architectures with respect to 
information-processing and incentive-governance. The fragmentation of task allocated to 
single workers requires a different control system and system of coordination than the 
Japanese system based on 'transferable work components' which can allocated to the workers 
in small group. This example shows that routines must fit with each other in order to provide 
a required performance. 
 
Complementarity is an attribute of elements of a given system (network, production process 
or firm) and arises if single elements of the systems interact in such a way to influence the 
overall performance of the system. An good example is provided by the personal computer: 
The choice of best components (CPU, motherboard, graphic card, software) does not 
necessarily imply that this PC is better than all the others, indeed it might even not work if the 
'best' CPU cannot be put on the 'best' motherboard. This shows also that complementarity is 
deeply connected to the concept of linkages and interfaces, as with an adapter it might be 
possible to put the CPU on the motherboard. A useful metaphor for thinking about systems 
with complementarities is Stuart Kauffman's NK model (Kauffman 1993). The NK-model 
presents an intuitive mathematical metaphor to think about complementarity. The NK model 
is simple, it presents a system with N elements, each of which can take one of x possible 
states, and K dependence relations between these elements. The NK model can easily be 
thought to represent a firm with N routines. If a routine is not linked to any other activity then 
we have perfect separability. Under perfect separability each activity can be changed or even 
exchanged without compromising the working of the system, as the performance of other 
elements is not influenced. If an element is connected with other activities in the network, 
then its removal affects the performance of the other activities. 
 
Some routines will mediate the interaction between other routines and in this way influence 
the performance characteristics. These may be viewed as forming the organizational 'core' of a 
firm. If no such activities would exist then the firm would just be a collection of unrelated 
organizational and technological processes not interacting with each other. The 
interdependencies and complementarities between routines form the core of a firm. That 
means that routines that affect the performance of many other routines are critical. A change 
in one of those core routines affects the overall performance of the firm to a much larger 
extent than routines that are peripherical. This implies, that complementarity lowers the 
possibility to control perfectly the performance of the firm, as small changes may have large 
effects. Separable routines, that are peripherical, are more likely to be changed, as even 
negative changes do not have a pervasive effect and can be identified and isolated without 
affecting many other functions within a firm. A firm consisting only of separable activities is 
perfectly modular. This would allow perfect control of the performance of the firm, but in the 
end, this system is devoid of a formal coordination mechanism relating them to each other. 
Hence, it would no longer be possible to talk about a firm. 
 
The existence of highly interrelated activities has two implications on the process of 
organizational and technological search (Hölzl and Reinstaller 2003, Reinstaller and Hölzl 
2004). First, for core activities there are more trade-offs between the performance values of 
different other elements of the organizational system. The risk that the improvements in 
performance of some routines are offset by reductions in performance of other routines is 
high. The more complex the organization is the higher will be the likelihood that a change in 
one component may conflict with the overall performance. This implies that elements in the 
core are less likely to be changed. Improvements within the context of an existing 
organizational core take place by substituting, adding or changing routines that are peripheral. 
The second implication is that the core reduces uncertainty by representing a stable set-up. It 
represents a organizational design that works, and there is an incentive to keep the core 
elements of the operating procedures as they are. Together this implies that firms are slow and 
reluctant to change core routines. Firms are complex multi-dimensional bundle of routines, 
decision rules, incentive schemes whose interplay is largely unknown to those who manage 
the organization themselves, as with strong interdependencies the system can not be 
optimized by optimizing separately the elements it is made of. 
 
If shocks punctuate the evolutionary development and induce radical transformations, the 
strong complementarities in the core may turn into binding constraints by causing imbalances 
between activities and hindering adaptation. Then firms have an incentive to break up the 
constraint posed by complementarities between the different routines forming the core. It is 
difficult for firms to re-invent themselves. Empirical research shows that changes that require 
the change of core routines increase organizational mortality (Carroll and Hannan 2000). This 
explains why new firms are the carriers of radically new innovations both in respect to 
technology and organization. Incumbents have an advantage with cumulative changes. 
Organizational routines, while being an effective way of storing and reproducing 
organizational knowledge, are by their very nature a source of organizational inertia. 
 
The picture of the firm that emerges is one of a relative stability, which forms a focusing 
device to coordinate the actions of the people involved within the organization. Routines and 
rule-based behavior reduce the cognitive distance between the members of the organization 
(Nooteboom 1992). The focusing device helps to align perceptions, understandings, goals and 
motives. 
 
 
6 How do routines change? 
The firm a collection of organizational routines depicts the firm as rigid and inert. However, 
firms do change, and with them their routines. This raises questions about the usefulness of 
this view on the firm - especially from the perspective of evolutionary economics, where 
competition does not take the form of pushing prices to marginal costs, but rather replacing 
products and processes by ones that are better, more efficient or satisfy preferences more 
closely (Nooteboom 2001). The question is, how do routines change and how do firms 
change. This question is far from settled, and related to the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation in organizations (March 1991). The trade-off between efficiency of current 
production and the exploration of new products and new ways of doing things, related to the 
uncertainty of innovation, is one of the fundamental questions of the management of change. 
 
Most evolutionary models are based on competitive selection. This model has also been 
applied to the selection of organizational traits. But in the context of the firm as a network of 
interdependent routines and activities this model has serious limitations, even if it cannot be 
denied that the competition between firms should lead to the selection of collections of 
routines that yield the highest profits (Massini et al. 2002). A strong selection argument is 
impossible to make as it is the totality of routines that are subject to the 'market screening', 
rather than individual routines. Increasing the internal efficiency of some routines does not 
imply that the overall efficiency of the firm needs to increase as well. Outputs are selected by 
the market, not individual routines or transactions. Therefore, it is generally very difficult to 
link the performance of single routines to firm's overall performance. Competitive selection 
between firms cannot explain the diffusion of routines. 
 
The replication (copying) of organizational practices is a second mechanism (Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2004). For this reason, in organization science the idea of internal or managerial 
selection is dominant. Let us first consider the creation of a pool of variety for selection 
internal to the firm. This relates to the duplication of subsidiaries, divisions or departments. 
This redundancy is inefficient and difficult to manage (Nooteboom 2001). This possibility is 
open only to very large firm which have both the managerial and financial resources for the 
creation of internal variety of routines. Moreover, if we consider multinational firms, the 
subsidiaries are embedded in different economic and cultural environments, which may make 
it difficult to compare the efficiencies of routines or collection of routines. Even if it is 
difficult to obtain a clear picture of the contribution of each routine to the firm's overall 
performance, it is possible to consider of routine bundles related to identifiable and 
measurable activities such as total quality management or sales or logistic systems (Lazaric 
and Denis 2001). The internal selection of routines by management fiat is related to learning, 
imitation and local adaptation. However, there is a fundamental problem related to the 
managerial selection and local adaptation. The link between internal selection processes and 
environmental pressures needs not to be strong. It might well be that internal selection 
environments become divorced from external pressures leading to maladaptation (Sorenson 
and Stuart 2000). The incremental nature of local learning processes increases the effectivity 
of operating routines and production processes. But these improvements are realized in the 
neighborhood of the firm's existing activities, thus increasing the possibility that the local 
adaptation becomes divorced from the selection environment, leading to an obsolescence of 
underlying routines. 
 
As noted in the literature on the diffusion of organizational practices, examples of successful 
routine replication exist, as do examples of successful re-inventions of firms, such as the 
transformation of Preussag a diversified national mining company since 1923 into TUI (its 
new name adopted in 2002) now leader in the European tourism market. Critical in this 
respect is the capacity of the organization to absorb the new practices and to integrate them in 
the existing organizational context. This is an easier task for large firms with appropriate 
managerial and financial resources such as Preussag than for small firms, as re-focussing 
through acquisition is much easier than re-configuring an existing organizational structure. 
The interdependency of routines implies that the change of a routine not only alters the 
performance of other routines but more importantly it predetermines also the type of other 
routines. This implies that firms cannot easily be decomposed into its individual components. 
The structures and routines within firms share normally the fate of the firm itself. While 
individual skills and physical capital can be moved into alternative uses, the idiosyncratic 
structures and routines are usually specific to the firm itself (Winter 1998). Most of the firm's 
routines share the fate of the firm in which they were created (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004). 
This suggests that entrepreneurial action in response to firm exit may be an important element 
changing the pool of routines in an economy. The skills and physical resources released are 
released for alternative uses in existing and new firm, where they can be routinized in new 
and more efficient ways. 
 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
The specific feature of the evolutionary approach is that it explains the adaptive behaviors of 
firms through the tension between innovation and various selection mechanisms. It shows that 
rule-based behavior and routines can provide a useful basis for a theory of the firm which is 
concerned with change over time and development. However, the evolutionary theory of the 
firm is still basically a theory of why firms differ and provides a device for the study of 
industrial dynamics and evolutionary growth. 
 
The discussion of the firm as a collection of organizational routines and the change of routines 
has shown that an evolutionary theory of the firm needs not be restricted to the definition of 
innovation possibilities frontiers. An evolutionary theory of the firm may be able to provide a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of organizational boundaries and change. The 
understanding of how routines are formed and change is central and needed as foundation for 
an evolutionary theory of the firm that integrates the views of the firm as repository of 
knowledge and of the firm as a network of incentives and power. 
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